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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW - 1956
REAL PROPERTY
Adverse Possession - Auditor's Deed
An important and practical construction of Ohio Revised Code sec-
tion 5723.121 was rendered by the court of appeals in Mogren v. A.P
Investment Co.2 The defendant purchased certain land from the county
auditor pursuant to the provisions of this section. The plaintiff claimed
an open, notorious and adverse use of a private drive on defendant's land
for a period in excess of the preceeding twenty-one years. The action
brought by plaintiff was to enjoin defendant from obstructing plaintiff's
use of the drive. Taxes became delinquent in 1930, but the land was
not forfeited to the State of Ohio until 1950.
In an appeal on law and on fact, the court of appeals reversed a decree
for plaintiff and entered a decree for the defendant. The court noted
that under the statute an auditor's deed is free of all easements and cove-
nants running with the land that were not created prior to the time the
taxes or assessments became due and payable. The effect of this decision
is to create a statutory exception to the common law rules of adverse
possession, inasmuch as nonpayment of taxes has the effect under this
statutory construction of stopping all adverse possession of less than the
required twenty-one years. This decision also has the effect of vesting
the auditor with authority to convey a better tile than the legal title-
holder prior to forfeiture, inasmuch as such titleholder could not, of
course, wipe out rights of an adverse user of his land merely by a convey-
ance.
Appropriation Proceeding - Damages
A novel and yet practical claim for damages in an appropriation pro-
ceeding was before the court of appeals in the case of In ze Appropraton
of Easements For Highway and Slope Purposes.3 The plaintiff operated a
gas station adjacent to the highway. Certain portions of plaintiff's land
were condemned for highway improvement and specifically to convert
the highway into a divided highway with median stripes. The effect of the
" the conveyance of such real estate by the auditor shall extinguish all previous
title and invest the purchaser with a new and perfect tide, free from all liens and
encumbrances, except such easements and covenants running with the land as
-were created prior to the time the taxes or assessments became due and payable."
(Emphasis added).
2131 N.E.2d 620 (Ohio App. 1956).
'137 N.E. 2d 595 (Ohio App. 1955). Motion to certify the record was overruled
on December 21, 1955.
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improvement was to divert automobile traffic away from plaintiffs
property. The trial court gave certain special charges before argument
and refused others which had the effect of permitting the jury to award
damages to the residue by reason of diverted vehicular traffic. This the
court of appeals held to be error as "the owner of land abutting on a high-
way has no propery right in the continuation or maintenance of the flow
of traffic past his property."4 This decision certainly points up an im-
portant drafting consideration in the sale or lease of a business dependent
upon transient highway traffic when one considers the trend toward
limited access highways.
Covenant to Build Not Merged in Deed
A commendable decision was rendered by the court of appeals in
Gavm v. Keen.5  Plans and specifications were incorporated in a con-
tract to purchase a house under construction. After completion, a deed
was executed and the consideration paid, following which the purchaser
went into possession. Defective construction of the underground drain-
age system and inferior materials in the subfloor6 resulted in a wet base-
ment which was corrected upon additional expenditures by the purchaser.
The appeal claimed error in directing a verdict for the defendant in a
damage suit on the theory of defendant that the execution of the contract
merged into the deed. The court noted a long standing decision by the
Supreme Court of Ohio7 that a covenant to sell in a land contract is
merged in the deed and executed by it. The court, however, held that
covenants in such a contract to build or repair are of a nature entirely
different and distinct from the covenant to sell the land, and there is no
justification for merging these covenants with the execution and delivery
of the deed. The court noted, however, that acceptance of the deed
waives a claim for patent defects. Of course, whether defects are patent
or latent is a jury question in most cases. The obvious caveat to the
counselor is to suggest that the construction be inspected by an expert,
or that warranties be incorporated into the contract before the acceptance
"State ex rel. Merritt v. Linzell, 163 Ohio St. 97, 126 N.E.2d 53 (1955)
especially syllabus 3.
'100 Ohio App. 100, 135 N.E.2d 769 (1954). Motion to certify the record was
overruled on March 9, 1955. This decision is also discussed in the CONTRACTs sec-
tion, s.upra.
'Materials used were not in conformity with specifications of contract.
7Brumbaugh v. Chapman, 45 Ohio St. 368, 13 N.E. 584 (1887). It is important to
note that the decision of Birnbryer v. Lehman, 19 Ohio N.P (n.s.) 206 (1916)
directly in point for the defendant was rejected. The decision in the Galvin case
does not attempt to overrule the Brumbaugh case, but merely distinguishes it and
limits it to its facts.
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of the deed. The judgment of the trial court was reversed and the
cause remanded on the question as to whether the defects complained of
were latent or patent.
Property Rights - Filled Land
An important decision to lawyers concerned with the property rights
of filled in land along Lake Erie was rendered by the court of appeals,"
and affirmed by the Supreme Court of Ohio.9 The City of Cleveland
purchased certain land incident to the construction of a freeway (Me-
morial Shoreway). The deed of transfer was subject to plaintiffs lease.
The land possessed by plaintiff under its lease from the grantor to the city
was filled in land along the shore of Lake Erie. The freeway construction
involved condemnation of a portion of plaintiff's leasehold. The trial
court refused to permit the city to introduce evidence that the land in
question was filled and refused to instruct the jury that as to such filled
land the plaintiff could have no claim because all such land is owned by
the State of Ohio for the people.10 The theory of the trial court was that
the city was estopped from asserting this defense when it accepted the
deed subject to plaintiff's leasehold rights." The court of appeals dis-
posed of this argument by noting that a lease of such land for private pur-
poses constitutes a breach of the trust of the State of Ohio and is thereby
void ab initio. The issue as to the character and make up of the land in
question was therefore material and the rulings of the trial court were
consequently prejudiciously erroneous.
Both the decision of the court of appeals and the Supreme Court con-
tamin excellent discussions on damages allowable for such condemnation.
Assuming that the land in question was not filled in thereby entitling
plaintiff to damages, further error was held to have been committed by
the trial court in permitting the jury to award damages for loss of profits12
and inconvenience of travel occasioned by being required to follow a more
circuitous route due to the completed highway improvement.'3
'Cleveland Boat Service v. Cleveland, 130 N.E.2d 421 (Ohio App. 1955).
'165 Ohio St. 429, 136 N.E.2d 274 (1956).
" State ex rel. Squire v. Cleveland, 150 Ohio St. 303, 82 N.E.2d 709 (1948), espe-
cially syllabus 1.
' Cleveland Boat Service v. Cleveland, 130 N.E.2d 421, 425 (Ohio App. 1955).
'In re Appropriation by Supt. of Public Works, 155 Ohio St. 454, 99 N.E.2d 313
(1951) "As a rule, profits from commercial businesses on premises can not be shown
in an appropriation proceeding for the reason that such profits are too speculative,
depending as they do upon the acumen and skill of the one who carres on the
business, but, assuredly, it is proper to show the kinds of businesses to which premises
are adaptable."
" State ex rel. Merritt v. Linzell, 163 Ohio St. 97, 126 N.E.2d 53 (1955), especially
syllabus 2.
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One might, however, question the soundness of the holding of the
court of appeals that the damages awarded were manifestly excessive, be-
cause greatly in excess of the cancellation clause of the lease setting forth
the price to be paid lessee for permanent improvements installed in the
event of termination of the leasehold. The court of appeals expressly
rejected the city's argument that as a purchaser by deed, the only action
against it should be for interference by it of the peaceful enjoyment of
the land leased.1 4  Instead the court accepted the theory of plaintiff that
the action was in reality one for damages for the appropriation by the
city of part of its leasehold. Under such circumstances it is hard to see
why the contractual evaluation of damages between lessor and lessee
should enter into the verdict of the jury. The opinion of the Supreme
Court contains no comment on this point.
Priority of Liens
A problem bound to plague lawyers in the field of creditors rights was
resolved in the case of Southern Ohio Say. Bank & Trust Co. v. Bolce.'
5
The property was sold by judicial sale. The proceeds were insufficient
to pay federal tax liens, state taxes owing, mortgagees and perfected judg-
ment lienholders. Section 3672 of the U.S. Revenue Code as construed
by the United State Supreme Court' 6 subordinates the federal lien to that
of the mortgagee and judgment lienholder, -but as to all other liens, in-
cluding that to the state of taxes, the federal lien is superior. Ohio Re-
vised Code section 5719.25, however, vests the State of Ohio with first
-rights to the proceeds of a judicial sale of realty.17  This puzzler in pri-
orities was resolved with a decision that the interests of the mortgagee and
judgment creditor must be set out first in accordance with the federal
law, and the balance of the fund then must be used to satisfy the federal
lien. However, the mortgagee and judgment creditor must then pay out
of such fund a sum sufficient to satisfy the lien of the State of Ohio
before being entitled to retain any proceeds. Needless to say, if the fund
set out to the mortgagee and judgment creditor are less than the lien
"
4The deed was quitclaim not warranty.
' 165 Ohio St. 201, 135 N.E.2d 382 (1956) See Note, 8 WasT. Rns. L. REv. 89
(1956)
SnUmted States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954).
27 "If real estate is sold at judicial sale the court shall order that the taxes,
penalties, and assessments then due, and interest thereon, which are a lien on such
land or real estate at the time of the sale, be discharged out of the proceeds of such
sale. "
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